















When I first picked up Bruce Clarke’s last monograph, Posthuman Metamorphosis: 
Narrative and Systems (2008), it was not in the most auspicious circumstances. I was 
standing on a much delayed commuter train out of London, with just about enough 
room among the frustrated travellers to be able to hold a book, my elbows firmly 
pinned to my flanks. Yet, I remember little else from that 90-minute journey because 
of the mesmerising effect of the volume, particularly the pellucid exposition of 
Spencer Brown in the opening chapters. Thus, it was with a sense of anticipation that 
I picked up Neocybernetics and Narrative for the first time. 
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That anticipation was not initially rewarded. The book consists of an introduction and 
five, fairly long chapters. Each contains the thread of the thesis, but each could stand 
alone as sophisticated readings of particular narratives, popular or theoretical. The 
first chapter focuses on the science fiction novel, Mind of My Mind, by Octavia 
Butler. The second is devotedly purely to theory: that of Luhmann and Serres. 
Chapter 3 is mainly concerned with the films, Memento and Eternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind. The next chapter is a disquisition on Bruno Latour’s Aramis. Chapter 
5, at the end of the book, couples Bateson and Guattari in a discussion of Gaia-related 
issues. Each of these chapters is stimulating and involves juxtapositions that are 
startling and revealing. Yet the first chapter does not provide the auspicious opening 
that Posthuman Metamorphoses had. Its focus, as mentioned, is the Butler novel; but 
its key juxtaposition is Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999) and Derrida’s 
essay on ‘Telepathy’ (2007). Under the aegis of this juxtaposition, Clarke (19) asks: 
“What does it mean for a trace to endure, to cross over the distances and durations 
that intervene between its coming to be in one place and moment and its itinerary of 
future destinations?” If one accepts the terminology and concept of trace, this is a fair 
question. In partial answer, Clarke writes, 
 
If you want to see a picture of the soul, observe an intentional scratch on a rock. 
The élan with which we receive the traces of signs is the origin or Ursprung of 
stories that pivot on these radical passages, displacements in space, in time, or 
in embodiment. Such displaced materialities may also occur with shifts in the 
literal medium of the narrative text – for instance, the leaping back and forth 
from verbal to visual signifiers – or with metamorphic shifts in the diegetic 
body depicted by the signifiers of that text. Breaking this back down to the 
primal trace: any one mark, when received as a cue for cognitive operations, has 
multiple implications already built into it. Bound up in any mark is a potential 
dynamism, a contingent or nonrandom concatenation of signifying events, that 
is always already on the way to narrative formation. 
 
The verbal acrobatics of poststructuralism are often like a Marx Brothers routine, 
particularly the discussion of the legal document in A Night at the Opera (1935) in 
which, after much wrangling over “the party in the first part” and “the party in the 
second part”, the punchline reveals that “Everybody knows there ain’t no sanity 
clause”. Yet, Clarke has a sound point here: signs betray something of their sending 
and our creative readiness to receive them is the basis of narrative. Signs change in 
different media and they are ‘polysemic’. This gives them their potential to contribute 
to narrative. 
 
Although the first chapter proved a difficult read for me, the subsequent chapters, 
while still challenging, certainly made up for the opening and develop Clarke’s thesis 
with the élan he credits to readers of signs. The second chapter gets down to business 
with a discussion, ostensibly, of Serres and Luhmann, but is equally concerned with 
von Foerster, whom Clarke references in a particularly cogent critique of the first-
order fashion in which Serres treats the idea of ‘noise’. Ultimately, Serres ‘noise’ is 
found problematic because it is still moored to the problematic of transmission and 
reception. Freed from the Derridean overtones in this chapter, Clark makes a 
persuasive case for the “infinite play of forms” as characteristic of the operational 
closures of observing systems.  
 
Chapter 3 is pivotal. Putatively analysing two movies, it begins with an incredibly 
fresh take on ‘feedback’, taking Jimi Hendrix’s trademark sound – which, over four 
exciting pages, Clarke makes the reader feel – and mixing it with observations on 
Kauffman’s discussion of recursion and the lap games at the 1978 Whole Earth 
jamboree. The passage is typical of the jarring, but illuminating, mash-ups that recur 
throughout the book. On this occasion, it serves a discussion of some ‘traditional’ 
narratological concepts: analepsis and prolepsis. The cybernetic ‘body electric’ of 
Hendrix is implied to be of a piece with the taskk of imagining the troublesome 
‘virtual fabula’ of films like Memento. 
 
It is worth mentioning at this point that Clarke’s work on narrative is completely out 
of the mainstream of contemporary narrative theory – and a good thing, too. Clarke’s 
frame of reference would be difficult to assimilate to ‘postclassical narratology’ 
because the reading list of scholars in the latter only very partially overlaps with his. 
It is for this reason that he is able to articulate some concepts that ‘postclassical 
narratology’ cannot. One of these is the recursive, seemingly disembodied, 
problematic narrative processes that have been thrown up by complex storytelling and 
the contemporary puzzle film (see Buckland 2014). Another is the sustained 
consideration of the process of observership in relation to narrative. Discussing 
Avatar in Chapter 5, Clarke (177) notes, 
 
Three of the five narratives [Mind of My Mind, Eternal Sunshine . . ., Memento, 
Aramis, Avatar] we have examined stage and mediate a fictional network 
centered on a technological system that, when it fails or even when it works all 
too well, fails to deliver the social goals for which it is designed. In the stories 
of the characters involved, this lapse is usually a desirable outcome, a fortunate 
failure. But, in any event, as usual, the fault lies not with our designed systems, 
but with ourselves, the designers. 
 
Indeed, Clarke argues at the very end of the book, that the vision of Gaia is, 
effectively, a “renovation of the observer’s relation to its universe in second-order 
systems theory” (181). In a sense, this addresses the issue that spurred Clarke to write 
this book: that neither media nor narrative are capable of cognizing on their own. His 
account of both amounts to a superbly provocative attempt to present their meaning 
processes in an autopoetic frame avoiding the pitfalls of “subject-centered and 





Buckland, W. (ed.) (2014) Hollywood Puzzle Films: London and New York: 
Routledge/American Film Institute. 
 
Derrida, J. (2007) ‘Telepathy’ in P. Kamuf and E. Rottenberg (eds.) Psyche: Inventions of the 
Other Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Kittler, F. (1999) Gramaphone, Film, Typewriter, trans G. Winthrop-Young and M. Wutz. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
